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Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association: United
States Supreme Court Gives First Amendment
Protection to Ambulance Chasing Through the
Mail
INTRODUCTION
Advertising by attorneys became permissible in 1977 when the
United States Supreme Court struck down a state disciplinary
rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising.1 The Court held
that limited forms of advertising by attorneys are constitutionally
protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment. Based
on this decision, the Court has consistently held that total bans on
the various modes of advertising by attorneys are unconstitutional
under the first amendment's free speech guarantee.3 From initially
allowing very limited newspaper advertising 4 the Court has contin-
ually expanded the permissible tactics attorneys may use to adver-
tise for new clients.
This expansion reached its peak in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association.5 In Shapero, the United States Supreme Court for
the first time failed to apply the distinction it had previously made
between attorney advertising and soliciting of potential clients. By
including solicitation within the scope of permissible attorney ex-
pression, attorneys may now obtain the names of potential clients
from such sources as police reports, court records, obituaries, and
the evening news. They may then write these individuals personal-
ized letters, known as targeted direct-mail solicitation letters,6 of-
fering services for particularized legal problems.
This Note will show how this development occurred and will
1. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2. Id. at 384. The first amendment's free speech clause provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I.
The first amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Bridges v. California. 314 U.S. 252, 263 n.6 (1941) (citing Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939)).
3. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text
(where the Court struck down an absolute ban that prohibited attorneys from mailing an-
nouncement cards to the general public). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), infra notes 81-85 and accompanying
text (where the Court invalidated a regulation that prohibited advertising by attorneys that
contained information and advice targeted to individuals with a specific legal problem).
4. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
5. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
6. Id. at 1922.
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argue that the expansion to attorney solicitation was inappropri-
ate. The Note argues that although the Court has not specifically
distinguished between advertising and soliciting as modes of com-
munication, its past cases have, up until Shapero, consistently
demonstrated the application of this distinction.
This Note begins with an overview of attorney advertising and
solicitation from both judicial and public perspectives. Then the
cases that led to the Shapero decision are reviewed in the context
of how the distinction between advertising and solicitation guided
the Court in its previous decisions. The Note will then discuss the
Shapero Court's opinion and evaluate its reasoning, particularly
its overextension of free speech protection to targeted attorney so-
licitation letters. Finally, the argument will be made that the
Court erred in blurring its previously-held distinction between ad-
vertising and soliciting.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ATrORNEY ADVERTISING AND SOLICITING
The right to speak has never been treated by the United States
Supreme Court as an absolute right to say anything.7 Rather, the
Court takes the view that certain types of speech are subordinate
to other interests of society and may therefore be regulated by the
states.8 The Court recognizes commercial speech, that is, speech
related to the economic interests of the speaker and audience,9 as
such a subordinate category of speech. 10 Commercial speech is
less vigorously protected than other types of speech because the
Court gives deference to society's interest in restricting such
speech.1"
Attorney advertising and soliciting is included in the category of
commercial speech that may be regulated by the states. 2 Since
1977 the Court has, however, consistently held that the first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit the states from imposing com-
7. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961): "[W]e reject
the view that freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, are absolutes. . . . Throughout its history this Court has consistently recog-
nized . . . ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an
unlimited license to talk."
8. Id. at 50-51: "[R]egulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbade Congress or the States to pass, when
they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interest ....
9. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citation omitted).
10. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
11. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971) af-
firmed without opinion sub nom., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General
Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (citation omitted).
12. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 26
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plete bans on advertising by attorneys.1 3 The Court has deter-
mined that complete bans on attorney advertising are overly broad
and that the regulation of advertising must be no more extensive
than is necessary to serve the states' interest. 4
Currently, attorneys may engage in a wide range of advertising
tactics designed to bring in new clients. This development has
caused several Justices to argue that attorneys are putting fees
ahead of their clients' interests. Justice Powell, since his retire-
ment from the United States Supreme Court, has expressed this
view:
One of the developments that I personally regret is virtually
unlimited advertising by lawyers. . . .I like to think of one who
is a lawyer as not practicing law primarily to make money. I
realize you have to make enough to pay your overhead and to
provide for your family, so I'm not suggesting that lawyers
should not be adequately compensated.
But our system depends on the rule of the law, and lawyers
are officers of the court. And the courts persevere only with the
aid and assistance of lawyers [in protecting] the liberties and
freedoms of our people.15
Retired Chief Justice Reynoldson of the Iowa Supreme Court
in reverting to Justice Powell's observations writes: "I suggest that
the legal profession is a calling that, unlike a business, still in-
volves the unique and basic concept that a client's interest must be
put before that of the lawyer. It follows that the pursuit of clients
and fees must not be the all-consuming goal of the practitioner."' 6
In Florida Bar v. Schreiber,17 Justice Ehrlich in his concurring
opinion wrote the following regarding attorney direct-mail solici-
tation letters:
My sadness emanates from my realization that we are leaving
an era of professionalism in the practice of law which has well
served our profession and the public most of this century, and
are now embarked on a course of continued commercialization
of the legal profession under the guise of first amendment rights,
mandated by the highest court in the land, where direct-mail
solicitation apparently cannot be proscribed.' 8
These recent decisions removing restrictions on attorney adver-
tising and soliciting have also been significant in undermining
public opinion on the legal profession. One Iowa survey demon-
13. See infra notes 77-78, 81-85 and accompanying text.
14. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
15. Reynoldson, The Case Against Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at
60.
16. Id. at 61.
17. 402 So. 2d 599, 599 (Fla. 1982).
18. Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
1989]
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strates that virtually unlimited attorney advertising is detrimental
to the legal profession. In Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Humphrey,x" a case dealing with Iowa's electronic media rule, the
Iowa Supreme Court appointed former Chief Justice Moore as a
hearing officer.20 The evidentiary record included a public survey
on attitudes and opinions regarding attorney advertising.2" The
survey questioned persons on their attitudes about attorneys both
before and after viewing television commercials.22 After viewing
the commercials, opinions dropped significantly with respect to
several characteristics of an attorney: trustworthiness, from sev-
enty-one percent to fourteen percent; professionalism, from sevw-
enty-one percent to twenty-one percent; and honesty from sixty-
five percent to fourteen percent.2 3
A recent Florida survey demonstrates that direct-mail solicita-
tion will have a negative effect on attorneys' professional image
and the legal system. The survey was conducted in response to
Florida's allowing its attorneys to engage in direct-mail solicita-
tion beginning on January 1, 1987.24 Shortly after its inception,
the Florida Bar commissioned an independent firm to survey pub-
lic response to direct-mail solicitation. The survey found a signif-
icant percentage of Floridians believe that direct-mail solicitation
by attorneys contains minimal information and appeals to emo-
tions rather than to reason.26 Floridians also believe this form of
solicitation causes frivolous lawsuits that result in increased legal
costs.27 A significant number of those who received one of these
letters indicated that it lessened their respect for the legal profes-
sion and the judicial process as a whole.2"
A committee appointed by the Florida Bar president to ascer-
tain whether Florida lawyers were abusing direct-mail solicitation
found abuses by lawyers and harm to the public were inherent in
direct-mail solicitation.2 The committee concluded that the prac-
19. 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984).
20. Id. at 567.
21. Reynoldson, supra note 15, at 60.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla. 1986). After study-
ing direct-mail solicitation to persons known to have a specific legal problem, the Florida
Supreme Court found that it could be regulated but not completely prohibited. Id. The
Florida Supreme Court stated that if the regulation proves unworkable and is continually
abused, the court would consider amending the solicitation rule. Id.
25. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Florida Bar in Support of the Respondent at 9,
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 87-16).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9-10.
29. Id. at A2.
[Vol. 26
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tice should be banned absolutely;30 the Shapero decision precludes
that ban from happening.
In Shapero, the United States Supreme Court struck down an-
other complete ban on attorney expression.3" The ban at issue was
designed to serve the state's interest by preventing attorneys from
sending personalized solicitation letters to individuals whom the
attorneys knew to have a legal problem32 -in other words, "ambu-
lance chasing through the mail." The Shapero decision is signifi-
cant because for the first time the Court declared unconstitutional
a disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from soliciting for cli-
ents. Previously, it had only struck down prohibitions on attorney
advertising for clients. While advertising and solicitation are alike
in that all advertising contains an element of solicitation,3 3 solici-
tation does not involve advertising.3 4 "Solicitation" refers to a
communication that is directed specifically to a particular individ-
ual and is often designed to get an individual to take action.35
"Advertising," on the other hand, most often refers to a communi-
cation directed to the general public, usually through an imper-
sonal medium such as a newspaper or billboard. 6
This Note will show, based on prior Supreme Court decisions,
that the distinction between advertising and soliciting is both ap-
propriate and necessary. In fact, it is just the Court's failure to
adhere to this distinction that gave rise to the incorrect decision in
Shapero. The analysis will begin with a history of the cases on
attorney advertising and soliciting, and will then show how the
Shapero Court misinterpreted these decisions.
II. A HISTORY OF THE FREE SPEECH PROTECTION GIVEN TO
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING AND SOLICITING
The Shapero decision departs from a line of cases on advertis-
ing and soliciting by attorneys that established the boundary of
their protected free speech. To understand what repercussions
may occur as a result of the Court's failure to follow its own pre-
cedent, it is first necessary to analyze the prior Supreme Court
decisions.
In one of the earliest decisions concerning advertising and free
speech, the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen37 recognized that
30. Id.
31. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923.
32. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (1987).
33. See generally BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 50 (5th ed. 1979).
34. Id. at 1248-49.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 50.
37. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen was restrained by the police from distributing
1989]
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commercial speech, in this case handbill advertising, is not pro-
tected by the first amendment's free speech clause.38 The
Chrestensen Court found it was within the states' power to regu-
late commercial advertising as a matter of legislative judgment.3 9
After Chrestensen, virtually every state exercised its regulatory
power by adopting the American Bar Association's Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.40 The code contained disciplinary rules
prohibiting attorneys from advertising or soliciting.4
The commercial speech doctrine was subsequently restricted by
the Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.42 In Virginia, the Court
redefined the scope of Chrestensen and extended a limited free
speech protection to commercial speech, in this case prescription
price advertising.43 They made it clear, however, that the state
could regulate pharmacists and protect small pharmacies as long
as it did so without imposing a total prohibition on the free flow of
information. 4" The Court held the public had a protected first
amendment interest in the free flow of truthful information.4 5 It
found that a total prohibition on prescription price advertising
took away information needed by consumers to make intelligent
economic decisions.46
In a particularly significant footnote, the Court in Virginia dis-
tinguished attorneys, as well as doctors, under its commercial
speech doctrine.47 In making a distinction between professions
handbill advertisements in violation of a sanitary code. He obtained an injunction to enjoin
the police from interfering with the distribution. The Supreme Court reversed the decree.
38. Id. at 54. The Court found that the first amendment protects the free conveyance
of information and opinion but does not impose upon government any restraints in regulat-
ing commercial advertising. Id.
39. Id.
40. Report of Spec. Comm. to Secure Adoption of the Code of Prof. Resp., 97 Ann.
Rep. ABA 268 (1972).
41. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) provided in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not publi-
cize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine adver-
tisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone
directories, or other means of commercial publicity. ... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1969). Disciplinary rule 2-103(A) provided in full: "A law-
yer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a law-
yer." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1969).
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (where a consumer group challenged a Virginia statute
forbidding the advertising of prescription drug prices as necessary to maintain the profes-
sional standards of pharmacists and to protect smaller pharmacies).
43. Id. at 770.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 765
46. Id.
47. Id. at 773 n.25.
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial adver-
tising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the
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that provide a product as opposed to those that provide a service,
the Court emphasized the evils inherent in attorney advertising."8
Once the door was opened by allowing pharmacists to advertise
prescription prices, attorneys also began to advertise. Choosing to
overlook the dictum of the Virginia Court's footnote, in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona,49 the Court specifically determined that ad-
vertising by attorneys was entitled to the free speech protection of
the first amendment.5 0 The Bates Court made inroads into the
complete ban that existed on attorney advertising by holding that
the free speech clause protects truthful newspaper price advertis-
ing by attorneys for routine legal services.5
The Bates decision did not completely abolish the states' power
to regulate advertising by attorneys. 2 The Court found that false,
deceptive, or misleading advertising is subject to prior restraint.53
For attorney advertising that does not fall into one of these cate-
gories, the Court established three principles which provide a basis
for determining whether attorney commercial speech is protected
by the free speech clause or whether a prohibition on such speech
is properly within the states' regulatory power. First, the free
speech interest to be protected is the consumer's need for the free
flow of information.54 Second, this interest in the free flow of in-
formation is balanced against the states' interest in preventing the
evils of advertising and maintaining the integrity of the legal pro-
fession.5 5 Third, the states may place reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, and manner of advertising by attorneys.5
In determining that consumers have a substantial need for at-
torney advertising, the Bates Court looked to advertising to pro-
distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may required consider-
ation of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dis-
pense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite
variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and
deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.
Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Petitioners placed an advertisement in a newspaper listing
their fees for certain routine legal services. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the disci-
plinary measures taken against the attorneys for violating the ban on attorney advertising.
50. Id. at 384.
51. Id. at 383-84.
52. Id. at 383.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 364. Consumers often have a concern for the free flow of advertising be-
cause of the important societal interests served by such speech. Id.
55. Id. at 367-79. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978), the
Court found Bates to hold "[t]hat the justifications for prohibiting truthful, 'restrained'
advertising concerning 'the availability and terms of routine legal services' are insufficient
to override society's interest, safeguarded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, in
assuring the free flow of commercial information."
56. Id. at 384.
1989]
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vide a free flow of information that assures informed and reliable
decisionmaking.57 In applying the balancing-of-interest test, the
Bar Association argued the complete ban on advertising should
remain intact because of advertising's negative effect on profes-
sionalism 58 and its inherently misleading nature .5  The Court,
however, rejected these arguments. In rejecting the Bar's analysis,
the Court followed the precedent of Virginia by extending free
speech protection in the commercial setting to newspaper price ad-
vertising of routine legal services.6°
The Court held that advertising by attorneys deserves limited
free speech protection."' In reaching this finding, the Court noted
that the medical profession allows advertisements but prohibits so-
licitation of patients. 2 This is a distinction that the Bates Court
seemed willing to make, if only in dictum. Subsequent courts,
however, have adopted it.
Only two years later, the Court expressly confined free speech
protection to advertisements by attorneys, a and they refused to
extend the protection to in-person solicitation by attorneys.6 4 In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, an attorney was disci-
plined for violating a total ban on solicitation when he visited two
accident victims in person and persuaded them to retain him. 65 In
upholding the disciplinary action taken against the attorney, the
Supreme Court made a distinction between newspaper price ad-
vertising and in-person soliciting.68 The Court stated that in-per-
son solicitation, unlike the advertisements at issue in Bates, is not
protected by the free speech clause.67
57. Id. at 364 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976)). The Court reasoned that advertising
informs the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services thereby
performing a role in the allocation of resources in our economic system. Id.
58. Id. at 368-72. The Bar asserted that the advertising would have a negative im-
pact on the profession because clients would perceive attorneys as being motivated by pecu-
niary gain. The Court responded that clients do not expect attorneys to work for free. Id. at
368-69.
59. Id. at 372-75. The Bar also argued that attorney services are individualized, and
therefore comparisons among attorneys are misleading because consumers are ignorant as
to the specific legal services they require, and that advertising will not concentrate on the
skill factor of the practitioner. The Court found that, although some services provided by
attorneys are unique, the only ones that would be advertised are routine. Also, the inevita-
ble uniqueness of advertising by attorneys does not cause the advertisement to be mislead-
ing provided the attorney charges only the fee stated in the advertisement. Id. at 372-73.
60. Id. at 384.
61. Id at 383.
62. Id. at 369 n.20 (citing 235 J.A.M.A. 2328 (1976)).
63. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978).
64. Id. at 449.
65. Id. at 449-54.
66. Id. at 455.
67. Id.
[Vol. 26
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In applying the balancing test set out in Bates, the Ohralik
Court found the states' interest in regulating solicitation out-
weighs the consumer's need for the free flow of information and is
therefore within the states' regulatory power.6 8 In justifying the
complete ban on in-person solicitation, the Court found that the
states have a "compelling" interest in protecting consumers from
aspects of solicitation that involve overreaching and undue influ-
ence.6 9 The Court also distinguished advertisements from in-per-
son solicitation by noting that the latter is not open to public scru-
tiny, unlike the former.70
The Ohralik Court used the same premise as the Bates Court in
focusing on the consumers' need for the free flow of information to
make informed and reliable decisions.7 1 In Ohralik, however, the
Court saw the consumers' need as not substantially advanced by
in-person solicitation.7 2 Furthermore, the Court found the adver-
tising allowed by the Bates decision provided consumers with a
source of information needed to make informed and reliable deci-
sions, and this precluded the need for in-person solicitation.7 3
In keeping with this distinction between advertising and solici-
tation, the Court in In re Primus4 found the states may, under
certain circumstances, impose a complete ban on all potential cli-
ent solicitation speech by attorneys that involves a commercial
transaction.75 As in Bates, the Court reiterated that the states are
free to place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
solicitation by attorneys, as the states have a special interest in
68. Id. at 457-59.
69. Id. at 462. Unlike advertising that the reader can easily ignore, in-person solici-
tation may often be a pressure situation not giving the potential client time for comparison
or reflection before responding. The goal of in-person solicitation may be to give only one
side of the presentation, which leads to a fast and perhaps poor decision. Id. at 457. The
ban on in-person solicitation prohibits attorneys from using information as bait with which
to obtain an agreement to represent a client for a fee. Id. at 458.
70. Id. at 466. With in-person solicitation it is difficult or impossible to obtain relia-
ble proof of what actually happened because there are often no witnesses. Id.
71. Id. at 457-58 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 364).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 458 n.15.
74. 436 U.S. 412 (1978)(involving an attorney who sent a letter to an individual
offering free legal representation by the American Civil Liberties Union in a lawsuit. In
reversing the disciplinary measures that were taken against the attorney for violating a
complete ban on attorney solicitation, the Court did not invoke the free speech clause of
the first amendment. Rather, the Court found the solicitation ban impinged upon the asso-
ciational rights of the attorney under the first amendment. The Court, in finding that the
attorney's actions were not within the state's regulatory power, gave considerable weight to
the fact that the letter was not motivated by pecuniary gain and that the ACLU pursues
litigation as a means of effective political expression and association).
75. Id. at 437 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
1989]
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regulating members of a profession they license. 6
Following this trend of cases, the Court expanded the free
speech protection which was formerly limited to newspaper price
advertising to include blanket mailings by attorneys to the public
at large." In refusing to allow a complete ban on such mailing,
the Court in In re R.M.J. reasoned that mailings to the public at
large are not inherently misleading and possible deception can be
controlled by means less restrictive than a complete ban."8
In reaching its decision in R.M.J. the Court applied a four-part
test that was first announced in Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York."9 The test re-
fined the principles used in Bates"0 to determine whether commer-
cial speech is protected by the first amendment. Under the Cen-
tral Hudson test, in order for commercial speech (such as
attorney advertising) to receive free speech protection, it must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, the Court
requires the governmental interest to be served by the regulation
of commercial speech to be substantial. The regulation must also
advance the governmental interest. Finally, the regulation must be
no more extensive than is necessary to serve that governmental
interest. The Court has continued to apply the Central Hudson
test in cases involving attorney expression; it was applied in both
Zauderer and Shapero.
Both the Bates and the R.M.J. decisions protect advertising by
attorneys which is distributed to the general public. This protec-
tion was expanded by the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio"1 to include advertis-
ing distributed to the general public that is directed to a group of
persons with a specific legal problem. 2 The Court rejected the ar-
gument that this type of advertising was soliciting. 3 Instead, the
Court found because this advertising is open to public scrutiny
and does not require an immediate response, it does not pose the
76. Id. at 438.
77. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982).
78. Id. at 206-07
79. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (where the Court struck down a regulation that prohibited
electric utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity as a violation of the free
speech clause).
80. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
81. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
82. Appellant ran a newspaper advertisement suggesting that his firm would re-
present defendants in drunk driving cases. Id. at 629-30. Later he ran a newspaper adver-
tisement aimed at women who had suffered injuries from their use of a contraceptive
known as the Dalkon Shield. Id. at 630-31. The appellant was issued a public reprimand by
the Ohio Supreme Court for, among other things, soliciting legal employment. Id. at 636.
83. Id. at 641.
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problems of in-person soliciting that justify a total ban.84 The
Court concluded that attorneys may not be disciplined for truth-
fully soliciting through written advertisements. 5
This series of cases illustrates the Court's distinction between
advertising and soliciting. Advertising, which is directed to the
general public, was given free speech protection. Soliciting, which
is directed to a particular individual, did not receive the protec-
tion. In Shapero, however, the Court abandoned this distinction.
III. THE SHAPERO DECISION EXPANDS FREE SPEECH
PROTECTION TO INCLUDE TARGETED DIRECT-MAIL
SOLICITATION LETTERS
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association86 the Court blurred its
previously distinguishable line between advertising and soliciting.
This was accomplished by giving free speech protection to solicita-
tion letters sent by attorneys directly to individuals with a known
legal problem. 7
Petitioner, Richard D. Shapero, sought permission from the
Kentucky Attorneys' Advertising Commission88 to send a solicita-
tion letter89 for legal business to homeowners who had a foreclo-
sure suit filed against them.90 The Commission declined to ap-
prove the letter, as it was in conflict with a Kentucky rule8'
prohibiting the sending of solicitation letters to individuals with a
84. Id. at 641-42.
85. Id. at 647.
86. 108 S. Ct. 1916.
87. Id. at 1921-22.
88. The Attorneys' Advertisihg Commission is responsible for upholding the attorney
advertising regulations stated in the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Ky. Sup. Ct.
Rule 3.135(3)(1988). Id. at 1919 n.1.
89. The solicitation letter read as follows:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true,
you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your
home by ORDERING your creditor to STOP and give you more time to pay
them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE informa-
tion on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just
call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is NO
charge for calling.
Id. at 1919 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.
91. The Kentucky rule provided in full, "A written advertisement may be sent or
delivered to an individual addressee only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other
than a family, to whom it is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it
is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the
addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public." Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule
3.135(5)(b)(i). Id. at 1919-20 n.2
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known legal problem. 2 Although the Commission declined to ap-
prove the letter, it recommended that the Kentucky Supreme
Court amend the rule in light of the Zauderer decision"3 because
the rule violated free speech. 4
Shapero petitioned the Kentucky Bar Association's Ethics Com-
mittee95 for an advisory opinion regarding the rule.96 The Ethics
Committee upheld the rule, reasoning that it was consistent with
Rule 7.397 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. "
92. Id. at 1919.
93. In Zauderer, the Supreme Court held that a state may not, consistent with the
free speech clause, prohibit attorneys from soliciting clients through public advertisements
directed to persons with a specific legal problem. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. See supra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
94. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
95. The Ethics Committee is the committee of the Kentucky Bar Association that
provides advisory opinions to attorneys who are in doubt regarding the propriety of contem-
plated conduct. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.530. Id. at 1919 n.l.
96. Id. at 1920,
97. ABA Model Rule 7.3, Direct Contact with Prospective Clients, provided in full,
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-
person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in-person, by tele-
phone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed
to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circu-
lars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind
provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they
might in general find such services useful.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
After the United States Supreme Court decided Shapero, the American Bar Association
amended ABA Model Rule 7.3, Direct Contact with Prospective Clients; the amended rule
provides in full:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional
employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or
prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so
is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by
written or recorded communication or by in-person or telephone contact even
when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be
solicited by the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
(c) Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting professional
employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a
particular matter, and with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional
relationship, shall include the words "Advertising Material" on the outside envel-
ope and at the beginning and ending of any recorded communication.
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions of paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate
with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not owned
or directed by the lawyer which uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit
memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to
need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983, as amended in 1989).
98. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
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In reviewing the Ethics Committee's Advisory Opinion, the
Kentucky Supreme Court found the Kentucky rule to be in con-
flict with the first amendment's free speech clause as expressed in
Zauderer.99 The Court then replaced the Kentucky rule with
ABA Model Rule 7.3.100 Both rules placed a complete ban on so-
licitation letters by attorneys to individuals with a known legal
problem.10 1 The Kentucky Supreme Court did not state how ABA
Model Rule 7.3 corrected the deficiencies of the Kentucky rule.102
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the issue of whether ABA Model Rule 7.3 was consistent with the
free speech clause of the first amendment, made applicable to the
States through the fourteenth amendment. 3  The Court in Sha-
pero was confronted with deciding a case that fell between
Ohralik and Zauderer. One the one hand, the case was similar to
Ohralik in that the solicitation letter Shapero desired to send was
personalized and directed to an individual with a known legal
problem. The crucial difference was that Ohralik involved an in-
person solicitation, whereas Shapero's planned solicitation took
the form of a letter. On the other hand, Shapero's letter was like
the newspaper advertisement in Zauderer because both were in
writing and addressed specific legal problems. However, Shapero's
letter was different because it was directed to a specific individual
with a known legal problem discovered by a prior investigation.
The Court found that Shapero was an extension of Zauderer.10 4
The Court held the free speech clause protects written efforts by
attorneys to bring in new clients, whether these efforts are di-
rected to a specific group in a newspaper advertisement or
whether they are directed to an individual in personalized
letters.0 5
The Court reasoned that the purpose of advertising by attorneys
is to reach individuals who actually need the legal services pro-
vided by the attorney.106 The Court found the free speech clause
does not allow a ban on certain speech just because it is more
efficient; states may not prohibit direct-mail solicitation letters
solely on the theory that to send the letters only to those they
99. Shapero, 726 S.W.2d at 300.
100. Id. at 301.
101. See supra notes 91 & 97.
102. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
103. Id. at 1920.
104. Id. at 1921 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641-42).
105. Id. The Court stated that "[K]entucky could not constitutionally prohibit [Sha-
pero] from sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, 'Is your home being
foreclosed on?' rather than his observation to the targeted individuals that 'It has come to
my attention that your home is being foreclosed on.'" Id.
106. Id.
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would interest the most is somehow improper.107
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that
the potential client who is subjected to the pressure of an attorney
in a personal manner through a direct-mail solicitation letter may
be overwhelmed by the situation and may be susceptible to undue
influence.108 In writing for the majority, Justice Brennan10 9 rea-
soned that a potential client will feel equally "overwhelmed" by
his legal troubles regardless of whether he is exposed to a writing
distributed to the general public addressing his particular legal
problem or a personal letter sent by an attorney to him specifi-
cally."1" According to Justice Brennan, the general advertisement
and the direct-mail solicitation letter have the same effect on the
potential client because they are both written."-
The Court distinguished direct-mail solicitation letters by attor-
neys from in-person solicitation, which was not afforded free
speech protection in Ohralik. Justice Brennan found that, when
the form of communication is in-person solicitation (such as in
Ohralik), there exists a greater potential for overreaching and un-
due influence. 11 2 He also noted that, because in-person solicitation
is not open to public scrutiny, it would be virtually impossible for
the states to regulate it."13 In dismissing the arguments that pre-
vailed in Ohralik, Justice Brennan reasoned that, when the form
of communication is written, such as a direct-mail solicitation let-
ter, it can be put aside, considered later, or discarded, thereby
removing the evils of overreaching and undue influence.:"
In recognizing the potential for deception inherent in solicita-
tion letters, Justice Brennan pointed out that state agencies could
107. Id. at 1921-22.
108. Shapero, 726 S.W.2d at 301.
109. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Kennedy, White,
and Stevens in finding that ABA Model Rule 7.3 was invalid. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919.
However, Justice White joined by Justice Stevens, wrote separately expressing the view
that the determination of whether a particular letter is worthy of free speech protection
should be addressed by the state courts in the first instance. Id. at 1925. Justice O'Connor,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, dissented, expressing the view that the states
should be given considerable deference in banning advertising that is potentially misleading
as well as advertising that undermines the states' interest in maintaining high ethical stan-
dards for the legal profession. Id. at 1925-31.
110. Id. at 1922. According to Brennan, it is not the "condition" of the potential
client that makes him or her susceptible to undue influence. Id. His theory is that it is the
"mode" of communication that represents the danger of lawyers overwhelming a potential
client with undue influence. Id.
111. Id. "In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode
of communication makes all the difference." Id.
112. Id. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
113. Id. (citing Ohralik, 433 U.S. at 466). See supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
114. Id. at 1922-23.
[Vol. 26
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operate to minimize this risk.115 He determined that the opportu-
nity for abuse or mistake involving direct-mail solicitation letters
does not justify a complete prohibition on that type of speech.""
The Court concluded the free flow of information obtained by so-
licitation letters is valuable enough to outweigh the regulatory cost
of separating harmful information from helpful information. 17
Having now shown how the Court has derived its opinion in Sha-
pero, this Note will go on to demonstrate how the Court's analysis
was in error.
IV. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR TARGETED DIRECT-MAIL
SOLICITATION LETTERS WAS NOT JUSTIFIED
In Shapero, the Court found the form that communication
takes determines whether or not attorney expression receives free
speech protection. 8 Because direct-mail solicitation letters are in
written form, they are entitled to free speech protection and there-
fore cannot be completely banned by the states. 19 In basing its
decision on the form the attorney communication takes, the Court
failed to recognize the distinction between advertising and solicit-
ing that guided the Court in the past. The three distinctions the
Court failed to make are that direct-mail solicitation letters, more
so than advertisements: (1) do not substantially advance the free
flow of information; (2) overreach potential clients; and (3) mis-
lead and put pressure on potential clients.
A. The Free Flow of Information Required to Make Informed
and Reliable Decisions Is Not Appreciably Enhanced by Direct-
Mail Solicitation Letters
Consider, first, the basis the Court previously used to reach its
decisions on constitutionally protected attorney advertising. It is
the consumer's need for the free flow of information to make in-
formed and reliable decisions, not the attorney's right to speak,
that justified the free speech protection given to attorney advertis-
ing. 120 This justification was enunciated in Bates to allow advertis-
115. Id. at 1923. Unlike in-person solicitation, which is not visible or open to public
scrutiny, written solicitation provides proof of what actually happened. Id. (citing Ohralik,
436 U.S. at 466). State agencies, for example, could require attorneys to prove the truth of
their facts stated, to explain how they discovered the facts and to substantiate their accu-
racy, to label the letters as advertising, or to include in the letters directions on how to
report inaccurate or misleading letters. Id. at 1924.
116. Id. at 1923.
117. Id. at 1924 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646).
118. Id. at 1922. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 1923.
120. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
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ing by attorneys and used in Ohralik to uphold a complete ban on
in-person solicitations by attorneys.121
In Ohralik, the Court found the consumers' need for the free
flow of information was not advanced by in-person solicitation.1 22
This same reasoning was not applied in Shapero, yet solicitation
letters do not appreciably advance the goal of informed consumer
decision making, because, as with in-person solicitation, the letters
discourage consumers from making comparisons of legal services.
This can result in spontaneous decisions that are not based on in-
formed and reliable information.
Solicitation letters by attorneys need not be given free speech
protection because, as the Court found in Ohralik, there are alter-
native means for consumers to obtain legal information in order to
make informed and reliable decisions. 23 Consumers are barraged
by attorney advertising on television and radio and in newspapers,
magazines, billboards, and letters sent to the public at large.
Therefore, the increase in the free flow of legal information attrib-
utable to solicitation letters will be minimally effective in supply-
ing reliable data to consumers. Additionally, solicitation letters
contribute very little to the quality of consumer information, as
they are often written to overwhelm the potential client into re-
taining the attorney.
B. Solicitation Has the Potential for Overreaching and Undue
Influence, Whether It Is In-person or in a Direct-Mail
Solicitation Letter
Consider next the basis the Court previously used to uphold as
constitutional a complete ban on in-person attorney solicitation. In
Ohralik, the Court allowed a total ban on in-person solicitation to
avert the likely possibility of overreaching and undue influence by
the attorney. 124 Because of the great potential for these evils, the
Ohralik Court considered a total ban on in-person solicitation to
be a reasonable restriction on the manner of speech. 25
Although the Shapero Court found solicitation letters not to
contain the evils of overreaching and undue influence because they
are in written form, 26 many of the evils of in-person solicitation
are present in a direct-mail solicitation letter. An unexpected per-
121. See supra notes 57 and 71 and accompanying text.
122. 436 U.S. at 457-58. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 458 n.15. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 462. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 449.
126. "Like print advertising, petitioner's letter-and targeted, direct-mail solicitation
generally- 'poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence' than does in-person
solicitation." Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
[Vol. 26
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sonalized letter from an attorney directed to an individual's par-
ticular legal problem has the potential to both unduly influence
and to intimidate the potential client.127 Solicitation letters are
likely to cause a potential client to submit to an attorney's offer of
representation because, as with in-person solicitation, the attorney
is already familiar with the individual's legal problem and has of-
fered his service. Additionally, solicitation letters in some in-
stances will give attorneys an opportunity for an in-person encoun-
ter before the potential client has a chance to weigh the available
alternatives. 128
Because of the potential for abuse, a total ban on solicitation,
whether in person or in writing, should be considered a reasonable
restriction on speech. Thus, a ban like the one struck down by the
Court in ABA Model Rule 7.3 should not be considered unconsti-
tutional, as it is just such a reasonable restriction on speech, it is
without reference to the content of the speech it regulates, and it
only restricts very limited types of communication: in-person solic-
itation and direct-mail solicitation letters sent to individuals with
a known legal problem.129 Since ABA Model Rule 7.3 is a reason-
able restriction on the manner of attorney speech, it should be
within the states' regulatory power as determined by the Court in
both its Bates and In re Primus decisions. 30
Along with overreaching potential clients, solicitation letters
such as the one written by Shapero often mislead by suggesting
what the attorney can do for the person solicited."'1 Direct-mail
solicitation letters, like Shapero's, also pressure the persons solic-
ited by encouraging them to call immediately.3 2
C. A Total Ban on Solicitation Is Justified Because
Solicitation Is More Likely to Mislead and Exert Pressure on
Potential Clients Than Advertising
Finally, consider the basis the Court previously used to find
price advertising is not misleading and in-person solicitation puts
pressure on potential clients. In Bates, the Court found price ad-
vertising is not misleading as it is doubtful any attorney would or
could advertise fixed prices for services that are unique. 33 The
Bates Court also found the only attorney services that lend them-
127. This is especially true because lawyers are trained to be persuasive writers. In
re Primus, 436 U.S. at 445 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. See also Ohralik, at 457-58.
129. See supra note 97.
130. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438.
131. See supra note 89.
132. Id.
133. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
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selves to advertisements are certain routine ones. 3 Solicitation,
however, lacks the characteristics that kept advertising from being
misleading.1 35 Solicitation is usually not geared toward the supply
of routine services, but, rather, toward an individual's unique situ-
ation. Additionally, because the situation is unique, prices are
generally not given in solicitation offers.
Attorneys may also mislead potential clients by sending them a
personalized solicitation letter without actually being familiar
with their legal problem. With the use of computers, attorneys are
able to personalize solicitation letters that are actually part of a
mass mailing. This will mislead potential clients into believing the
attorney has particular knowledge of their legal problems and that
the attorney has specifically tailored a course of action to deal
with the problem.
In addition to misleading potential clients, solicitation also ex-
erts undue pressure. The Court in Ohralik allowed the states to
place a complete ban on in-person solicitation, as solicitation was
used to put pressure on potential clients to agree to a representa-
tion.1 36 Similarly, solicitation letters pressure potential clients by
enticing them with cost-free offers or by stressing the urgency of
the situation. In Shapero, the Court failed to give deference to the
states' interest in regulating the pressure tactics that lead into a
professional relationship. 137 Instead, the Shapero Court found that
solicitation letters could be put aside and considered later, 138 thus
treating solicitation letters from attorneys like those designed to
sell consumer goods.
Unlike solicitation letters used to sell consumer goods, solicita-
tion letters by attorneys address individualized and specific legal
problems and are signed by an officer of the court. Therefore, con-
sumers who have had few contacts with the judicial system may
feel they must at least call the sender of such a letter, whereas few
consumers would hesitate to discard a solicitation letter peddling a
consumer good.
CONCLUSION
In Shapero, the Court redefines the extent to which free speech
protection will be extended to attorney efforts to bring in new cli-
ents. The Court found the form of communication determined if
134. Id.
135. The routine nature of the legal services advertised and the fee being stated is
what kept attorney advertising from being misleading in Bates. Id. at 372-73.
136. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. See supra note 69.
137. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1925 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1923. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss1/8
DIRECT-MAIL SOLICITATION
free speech protection attached to attorney expression. This
method prohibits in-person solicitation, but allows solicitation that
takes the form of a letter written to a specific individual.
The same reasons for allowing a complete ban on in-person so-
licitation are applicable to direct-mail solicitation letters by attor-
neys. Permissible advertising by attorneys already provides con-
sumers with a constant flow of legal information. This allows
consumers to make informed and reliable decisions, thereby ne-
gating the need for solicitation letters. Solicitation letters by attor-
neys are addressed to an individual's specific legal problem,
thereby opening the door to overreaching and undue influence by
attorneys. These letters often urge the solicited individual to take
immediate action, thus pressuring and intimidating the potential
client.
Solicitation by attorneys, whether in person or written, seeks to
incite an individual to retain the attorney. The Court, in granting
free speech protection to direct-mail solicitation letters, is placing
form over substance by ignoring the difference between advertis-
ing and solicitation.
John Weber
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